One of the collateral effects of the terrorist attack in Mumbai last fortnight has been a demand from various quarters to put certain restrictions on media's coverage of such events. In an advisory, the Union Government asked the television channels not to re-run or broadcast scenes of the Mumbai terror attack and to avoid providing the terrorists a platform to air their views. Media reports also suggest that the National Security Guards had sought restrictions on media coverage whenever its commandos were engaged in combat. They particularly mentioned live images on television channels showing commandos slithering down from helicopters and landing on Nariman House roof, which may have enabled the terrorists holed up inside to open fire on commandos before they could take positions. The NSG officials have also been quoted as stating that, in contrast, the operations at Taj Hotel were smoother since the TV channels were kept beyond the one-km radius. The Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sureesh Mehta too referred to the media as a "disabling factor" in the Mumbai operation. He also accused some television channels of jeopardizing the safety of soldiers with their coverage of the Kargil war in 1999.
Since all this has raised the hackles of journalists, it is important to put things in perspective. Just as the means of warfare have changed so have the rules. Most armies have tried to use the media to their advantage during hostilities. Before the First World War, even the German General Staff in its Handbook of War issued to officers held that, since reporters were indispensable, it was necessary to "control the media in the field." During World War II, the Nazis went a step further and recruited journalists as soldiers who shared all the risks. These "front reporters" produced some excellent reports and photographs, although in the process nearly 300 of them were killed during the war. In our own environment, during all external aggressions, since a state of emergency had been declared, the war correspondents were invariably "conducted" by officers of the defence public relations. In recent wars, the Americans started the system of "embedding" journalists with their frontline formations. But in almost all cases, the news reports were vetted before publication.
The limited war in Kargil fell in a different category altogether. Since it coincided with the advent of private television channels in our country, journalists were provided a reasonable amount of free access to information and movement. Since the Pak Army did not initially own up its intruders and its Air Force did not join battle, our journalists had a free run in getting the war images they wanted. This writer was witness to artillery guns being fired for camera effect. But, no hard information is available on whether media coverage had any bearing on operations - our own or the enemy's. But, all this did help boost the image and morale of troops, who were finding themselves beleaguered initially due to the surprise sprung on them by the Pak intruders.
However, security operations internally against terrorists are a different ball game altogether. In Punjab alone, we had two operations where different media strategies were used - with contrasting results. During Operation Bluestar in June, 1984, the media was kept at bay. The media was co-opted and provided a ringside view during Operation Black Thunder in 1988. The result was that while people continue to conjure up images of how Operation Bluestar was botched up, no such feelings are harboured about Black Thunder operation. Media definitely played a major role in forming public perception of the two operations.
There is no doubt that the Mumbai operation was a learning experience for the 24X7 electronic and internet media (as it was for the security forces). Yet, some of the criticism may be premature. For example, there is no hard evidence to suggest that the terrorists inside Nariman House fired on the commandos landing on the roof due to television images or after hearing the noise of choppers overhead. In fact, media's live coverage brought out the complexity of the operations in various places, including the Taj and Nariman House. Otherwise, the NSG, the Navy and the Government would have been hard pressed to explain the loss of nearly 200 lives and severe damage to property by 10 terrorists against whom nearly 1,000 securitymen were deployed for nearly 72 hours. The rumour-mongers would have had a field day, something akin to what continues to this day about Operation Bluestar even after 25 years.
There can be no hard and fast rules about all internal security situations, as the circumstances would vary in each one. But past experience points to positive fallout of operations carried out in full transparency. Of course, in Mumbai-like situations, where human lives are involved, the basic rules of reportage and self-regulation ought to apply even more stringently. Government regulation of the media is risky. Often governments and military leadership accuse media of irresponsible coverage when the coverage is in fact inconvenient to them. Where media is concerned, government distortion, disinformation and manipulation is an even greater threat. One is reminded of the film 'Wag the Dog’, which is about using media to create a complete tissue of lies. Though this is a piece of fiction and an extreme case, governments are known to indeed manipulate images to influence public opinion. The problem with the media usually is exuberance, though sometimes it may distort. But it has a greater interest in truth than the government - for the sake of its long term credibility. The decision in-principle of the News Broadcasters Association to form an "emergency protocol" to decide on such situations is a welcome step. Besides, a series of self-analysis by the Press Council of India or perhaps by the media organizations themselves on the Mumbai coverage would help in more professional coverage of hostilities in future.
Since all this has raised the hackles of journalists, it is important to put things in perspective. Just as the means of warfare have changed so have the rules. Most armies have tried to use the media to their advantage during hostilities. Before the First World War, even the German General Staff in its Handbook of War issued to officers held that, since reporters were indispensable, it was necessary to "control the media in the field." During World War II, the Nazis went a step further and recruited journalists as soldiers who shared all the risks. These "front reporters" produced some excellent reports and photographs, although in the process nearly 300 of them were killed during the war. In our own environment, during all external aggressions, since a state of emergency had been declared, the war correspondents were invariably "conducted" by officers of the defence public relations. In recent wars, the Americans started the system of "embedding" journalists with their frontline formations. But in almost all cases, the news reports were vetted before publication.
The limited war in Kargil fell in a different category altogether. Since it coincided with the advent of private television channels in our country, journalists were provided a reasonable amount of free access to information and movement. Since the Pak Army did not initially own up its intruders and its Air Force did not join battle, our journalists had a free run in getting the war images they wanted. This writer was witness to artillery guns being fired for camera effect. But, no hard information is available on whether media coverage had any bearing on operations - our own or the enemy's. But, all this did help boost the image and morale of troops, who were finding themselves beleaguered initially due to the surprise sprung on them by the Pak intruders.
However, security operations internally against terrorists are a different ball game altogether. In Punjab alone, we had two operations where different media strategies were used - with contrasting results. During Operation Bluestar in June, 1984, the media was kept at bay. The media was co-opted and provided a ringside view during Operation Black Thunder in 1988. The result was that while people continue to conjure up images of how Operation Bluestar was botched up, no such feelings are harboured about Black Thunder operation. Media definitely played a major role in forming public perception of the two operations.
There is no doubt that the Mumbai operation was a learning experience for the 24X7 electronic and internet media (as it was for the security forces). Yet, some of the criticism may be premature. For example, there is no hard evidence to suggest that the terrorists inside Nariman House fired on the commandos landing on the roof due to television images or after hearing the noise of choppers overhead. In fact, media's live coverage brought out the complexity of the operations in various places, including the Taj and Nariman House. Otherwise, the NSG, the Navy and the Government would have been hard pressed to explain the loss of nearly 200 lives and severe damage to property by 10 terrorists against whom nearly 1,000 securitymen were deployed for nearly 72 hours. The rumour-mongers would have had a field day, something akin to what continues to this day about Operation Bluestar even after 25 years.
There can be no hard and fast rules about all internal security situations, as the circumstances would vary in each one. But past experience points to positive fallout of operations carried out in full transparency. Of course, in Mumbai-like situations, where human lives are involved, the basic rules of reportage and self-regulation ought to apply even more stringently. Government regulation of the media is risky. Often governments and military leadership accuse media of irresponsible coverage when the coverage is in fact inconvenient to them. Where media is concerned, government distortion, disinformation and manipulation is an even greater threat. One is reminded of the film 'Wag the Dog’, which is about using media to create a complete tissue of lies. Though this is a piece of fiction and an extreme case, governments are known to indeed manipulate images to influence public opinion. The problem with the media usually is exuberance, though sometimes it may distort. But it has a greater interest in truth than the government - for the sake of its long term credibility. The decision in-principle of the News Broadcasters Association to form an "emergency protocol" to decide on such situations is a welcome step. Besides, a series of self-analysis by the Press Council of India or perhaps by the media organizations themselves on the Mumbai coverage would help in more professional coverage of hostilities in future.
No comments:
Post a Comment